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The epidemic of youth violence in the United States peaked in 1993 and has been followed by
a rapid, sustained drop. In parallel with our earlier treatment (Cook and Laub 1998), we assess two types
of explanation for this drop -- those that focus on “cohort” effects (including the effects of abortion
legalization) and those that focus on “period” effects (including the effects of the changing crack-cocaine
trade). Once again we are able to reject the cohort-type explanations, yet also find contradictions with an
account based on the dynamics of crack markets. The “way out” of this epidemic has not been the same
as the “way in.” The relative importance in homicide of youths, racial minorities, and guns, all of which
increased greatly during the epidemic, has remained high during the drop. Arrest patterns tell a somewhat
different story, in part because of changing police practice with respect to aggravated assault. Finally, we
demonstrate that the rise and fall of youth violence has been narrowly confined with respect to race, sex,
and age, but not geography. Given the volatility in the rates of juvenile violence, forecasting rates is a
risky business indeed. Effectively narrowing the range of plausible explanations for the recent ups and
downs may require a long time horizon, consideration of a broader array of problem behaviors, and
comparisons with trends in other countries.
Philip J. Cook John H. Laub
Duke University University of Maryland
and NBER3
After the Epidemic
The epidemic of violence that began in the mid 1980s was of
unprecedented intensity but narrowly channeled, like a flood in a
canyon; most of those caught up in this epidemic, either as victims or
perpetrators, were young black or Hispanic males.  That flood peaked in
1993-4 and has receded since.  The huge swing in rates – a tripling of the
homicide commission rate by adolescents over just eight years – is a
challenge to existing theories of the determinants of violence.  The
challenge for policymakers may be still more urgent:  Has enough been
learned from this epidemic to predict the next one, or to know what is
needed to prevent it?  To date both the upside and downside of the
epidemic have received some systematic attention (see, e.g., Tonry and
Moore 1998 and Blumstein and Wallman 2000), but there remains
considerable uncertainty, not to mention disagreement, about what
happened and why.
In our earlier analysis (Cook and Laub 1998), we characterized the major
explanations as either “cohort” or “period.” Cohort explanations
interpreted the increase in violence as the direct result of an increase in
the prevalence of exceptionally violent individuals, who in one prominent
account were labeled “super-predators” (Bennett, DiIulio, and Walters
1996).  Although influential politically, that type of explanation did not fit
the facts of the epidemic.  The super-predator theory suggested a secular
increase in violence-involvement rates from one birth cohort to the next,
but in fact there was an upsurge for a number of birth cohorts
simultaneously.  Further, the birth cohorts that were on the front lines
as the epidemic peaked during the early 1990s were not at all
exceptional with respect to their involvement in violence during their
younger years.  These facts strongly favor explanations that focus on
environmental factors during the epidemic period, rather than on trends
in the violent propensities of youth cohorts.
The most widely accepted “period” explanation focused on the drug trade,
especially crack cocaine, and the related increase in gun carrying and
use by youths (Blumstein 1995).  The importance of guns is evident from
the homicide data: all of the increase in youth homicide was due to guns
while the non-gun homicide rate remained essentially constant.  Every
category of homicide, including those associated with felonies,
arguments, and gang conflict, experienced a relative increase in gun use
(Cook and Laub 1998).  Other studies have provided evidence that the
timing of youth-homicide increases was closely linked to the introduction
of crack (Cork 1999; Grogger and Willis 2000).4
In this sequel, we extend our analysis to include an additional three or
four years of data (through 1998 or 1999) in an effort to document the
remarkable drop in youth violence that began around 1994.  We are
interested in assessing the two types of explanation for this drop, those
that focus on "cohort" effects (the composition of the relevant cohorts
with respect to violence proneness), and those that focus on "period"
effects (contemporaneous environmental determinants of violence).
• The most prominent “cohort” explanation attributes falling crime rates
to the legalization of abortion during the early 1970s (Donohue and
Levitt 2001).  But the facts of the epidemic increase and decline in
youth violence do not fit this or any other cohort explanation.
• There are a variety of “period” explanations, but the most prominent
is that the decline in violence followed the decline in conflict
associated with the crack-cocaine trade, and a concomitant decline in
gun carrying and use by young minority males (Blumstein 2000,
2001).  That explanation is plausible, but does not account for the
fact that non-gun homicide rates declined almost as rapidly as gun
homicide rates following the epidemic peak.
Thus, the drop in youth violence has been something of a mystery, just
as was the prior increase.  Our purpose here is not to solve the mystery,
but rather to bracket the domain of acceptable explanation.
A related issue is whether the “way out” of this epidemic has been the
same as the “way in”; specifically, are the post-epidemic patterns of
youth violence with respect to age, race, weapon use, and geography
similar to those that prevailed in the pre-epidemic period of the mid
1980s?  Or is there a hangover from this binge of violence?  The most
complete data are for homicide, where a hangover is indeed evident.
First, the relative importance of youths in the national violence picture,
which increased greatly during the epidemic, has remained relatively
high by historical standards; killers under age 25 accounted for 60
percent of homicides in 1998, compared to 43 percent in 1982 (before the
epidemic began).  Second, the relative involvement of blacks in homicide,
which increased during the epidemic, has remained high during the
downturn.  Third, while gun homicides accounted for all of the youth
homicide increase, they have shared the decline with non-gun homicides;
the result is that the gun percentage in youth killings was almost as high
in 1998 as in 1993, and much higher than in 1985.
For the broader array of violent crimes, including aggravated assault and
robbery, the primary indicators are based on arrest data, which reflect
police practice as well as the underlying crime patterns.  The arrest
trends help document the rise and fall of youth crime over the course of
the epidemic, and reveal some intriguing trends.  In particular, for
juveniles less than 18 the long-term trend toward parity (documented in5
Cook and Laub 1998) in both the male-female violence-arrest-rate ratio
and the black-white violence-arrest-rate ratio, has accelerated during the
downturn.1  In part this trend is due to a change in composition of
juvenile arrests for serious violence – robbery has been declining relative
to assault. (The predominance of males and blacks in assault is much
less than in robbery.)  And in part it is due to the intriguing fact that the
composition of assault arrests has been approaching parity; the recent
reduction in aggravated-assault arrests for juveniles has been greater for
males than females, and for blacks than whites.  But it is important to
note that the trend toward greater parity in assault is not present in the
homicide data, and most likely is a consequence of changing police
procedures rather than a reflection of underlying crime patterns (see
Zimring 1998, pp. 38-47).
The epidemic of youth violence is treated in all these analyses as national
in scope, but that is not self-evidently the case.  It is certainly possible
that the large movements in national aggregates conceal important
regional differences.  As one check on this possibility, we tabulate
homicide rates for youthful black males for the 15 jurisdictions that have
the highest counts of such homicides.  (These cities and counties
collectively accounted for over half of all homicides involving young black
male victims in the mid-1980s.)  Every one of them experienced a
substantial increase in homicide victimization for this group by the early
1990s; in all but two, that rate had fallen by 1997-8.  This high degree of
synchrony suggests that the epidemic was indeed nationwide.
The organization of this sequel follows the original article but with some
omissions and additions.  In particular, the discussion of data sources is
not repeated here, and we relegate to an appendix some of the updated
documentation of the “burden” of youthful violence on the criminal
justice system.  On the other hand, new material has been added to the
analysis of homicide, including an analysis of birth cohorts and of
synchrony among urban areas.  The principal sections concern juvenile
arrest and offending rates (I), homicide victim and offending patterns (II),
and a review of the evidence concerning whether the epidemic was due
primarily to cohort or period effects (III).  A final section (IV) recaps the
evidence that period effects are paramount, and discusses the
implications for projecting future rates of youth violence.
Before setting out on this path, a note on the timing and age-group
involvement of the epidemic is in order.  With respect to age, the
epidemic increase in violence was most concentrated on juveniles less
                                      
1 Of course, a number of criminologists have analyzed trends in relative offending rates
by gender and race. For a recent example on gender see O’Brien (1999) and on race see
LaFree (1998a).6
than 18, but also involved young adults ages 18-24.  (In discussing
juveniles, we usually focus on those ages 13-17 or 12-17, and refer to
that group as "adolescents.")  The relevant indicators all show that the
epidemic of youth violence peaked in the early 1990s.  The violent-crime
arrest rate for adolescents peaked in 1994.  For homicide, both the
commission rate and the victimization rates peaked in 1993 for both
adolescents and young adults ages 18-24.  In what follows we use either
1993 or 1994 as the peak year.
I. Juvenile Arrest and Offending Rates
Based on national statistics, the upswing in violence during the late
1980s appears quite mild.  In particular, the homicide rate increased
from 8.2 (in 1985) to 10.4 (in 1991) per 100,000, a high but not
unprecedented level.2  But this overall pattern conceals a remarkable
disparity among age groups.  In fact, the increase was concentrated
among youths under age 25,3 and was particularly intense for juveniles
under age 18 (Blumstein 1995, 2000).  This was an epidemic of youth
violence of unprecedented intensity, largely isolated from broader trends.
We begin our account with a focus on serious violence committed by
juveniles.  Here we have two indicators of the underlying phenomenon,
arrest data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) and victim
reports in the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS).  Both of these
indicators confirm the epidemic increase and subsequent reduction in
violence rates.  The next section then provides a more extensive account
focused on homicide, for which more detailed and accurate data are
available.
Figure 1 about here
For over two decades beginning in 1974, adolescent arrest rates for the
property crimes included in the FBI Index (burglary, larceny, and auto
theft) fluctuated in a relatively narrow band around 35 per 1,000 (Figure
1).4  Arrest rates for the violent Index crimes (rape, robbery, aggravated
assault, and criminal homicide) were also quite static during the first half
of this period, but then doubled between 1984 and 1994.  The decline in
both the property and violence arrest rates since 1994 has been rapid,
with the result that by 1999 the violence-arrest rates had returned near
                                      
2 webapp.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate.html, accessed on June 5, 2001.
3 Between 1985 and 1993, the homicide-victimization rate increased 74 percent for ages
20-24, 25 percent for ages 25-29, and just 11 percent for ages 30-34. For victims age
35 and over, the rate declined slightly.
4 See Cook and Laub (1986) for a commentary on the surprising stability of arrest rates
in the face of criminogenic trends in the socioeconomic and family status of children.7
the pre-epidemic level, and the property-arrest rates declined to a level
not seen since 1966.
Table 1 about here
While trends in arrest rates are mediated by police practice and do not
necessarily track the underlying changes in criminal activity, evidence
from the NCVS tells a similar story.  In most cases respondents who
report that they were victims of serious violent crime are able to estimate
the age of the assailant.  From these reports it is possible to estimate the
rate of commission for broad age groups, including for adolescents ages
12-17.  Commission rates for this group are reported in Table 1 for five
5-year periods through 1999.  These commission rates are several times
as high as the arrest rates, but exhibit roughly the same pattern, albeit
in more muted form: As with the arrest rates, the commission rates are
highest during the early 1990s, dropping back to the previous level (of
about 23 per 1,000) after 1994.
Figure 2 about here
Figure 2 provides a broader context for the trends in adolescent violence
arrests by depicting the age profiles of violence-arrest rates for males at
three points in time.  As expected the youthful end of the profile shifts up
sharply between 1985 and 1994, and then drops back most of the way
by 1999.  But this dynamic is not limited to youths:  By 1994 arrest
rates had increased by 40 percent for men in their twenties and 63
percent for men in their thirties, and while the rates for these groups
have declined since 1994, they have remained substantially higher than
1985.
Again it is important to ascertain whether these patterns are tracking an
underlying reality in terms of violent crime, or rather reflect changes in
police practice in making and recording arrests.  In this case, police
practice is most likely the answer. The elevated rates of arrest for
violence in recent years are mostly due to higher rates for aggravated
assault, a crime that is closely linked both logically and etiologically to
homicide.  Yet the trend in homicide arrests tells quite a different story
than the trend for aggravated-assault arrests.  Homicide arrest rates for
those ages 25 and over were actually declining during the surge of youth
violence, and have continued to decline since 1994 (Blumstein 2000, Fox
2000, and Rosenfeld 2000).  It appears that the increases in adult arrests
for aggravated assault are not the result of changes in offending but
rather police practice in domestic-violence cases (Cook and Laub 1998,
p. 42; Blumstein 2000, pp. 17-19).  The trend has been for police to treat
such cases with greater formality and seriousness in processing and
reporting.  Zimring (1998, p. 46) provides compelling evidence that8
increases in aggravated-assault arrests were due to a downward shift in
the line that separated aggravated from simple assaults rather than a
change in violent behavior among youth and adult offenders.
A.  Sex and Race
Arrests for violent crime are highly concentrated with respect to sex and
race.  In 1999, males constituted 83 percent of juvenile violence arrestees
(defined as under 18); thus, almost five times as many boys as girls were
arrested.  With respect to race, 41 percent of all juvenile violence
arrestees were black, while 57 percent of the juvenile violent arrestees
were white.  Per capita violent-arrest rates for blacks were almost four
times as high as for whites.
Figure 3 about here
Figure 3 depicts arrest rates by race and sex for the two most common of
the violent crimes, robbery and aggravated assault.  Each bar in this
chart represents both the 1994 and 1999 rates.  Robbery has the
greatest disparities by race and sex, and those disparities were largely
preserved during the sharp drop in arrests during that 5-year period.
(The “white” rate, which incidentally includes most Hispanics, did not
drop quite as much proportionately as the black rate.)  Arrest rates for
aggravated assault did not drop nearly as much as robbery overall, and
dropped hardly at all for whites and females.
Figure 4 about here
Both the relative decline in robbery arrests, and the changing
demographic composition of assault arrests, has had the effect of
reducing the race and sex disparities in arrests for violent crime during
the late 1990s.  (Over 90 percent of juvenile violent-crime arrests are for
aggravated assault or robbery.  Also included are rape and homicide.)
Figure 4 reveals that this trend has actually been evident for at least
three decades.  In 1970 both the male-female and the black-white arrest
ratios for juveniles exceeded ten.  By 1999 they had declined to
approximately four.  The male-female ratio has declined steadily, while
most of the decline in the black-white ratio occurred in the early 1970s
and again in the 1990s.
B. Conclusion
From both UCR and NCVS data, it appears that adolescents committed
violent crimes at a substantially higher rate during the early 1990s than
either before or since.  Based on the UCR arrest data, the national
epidemic of juvenile violence began in 1984 and peaked in 1994.  It is9
important to note that this epidemic did not reflect a general outbreak of
lawlessness; while arrest rates for violence doubled, arrest rates for
property crimes increased relatively little during this period.
Forty-one percent of juvenile violence arrests are for blacks, despite the
fact that they constitute only about 14 percent of the relevant
population.  White or black, most of the violence arrestees are males.
But these race and sex differences are less than half as large as they
were during the 1960s.  Thus arrests for violent offending are less
concentrated demographically now than in previous decades.  The
epidemic did not interrupt that trend.  But the trend in arrests for
aggravated assaults probably have more to do with police practice than
the underlying reality.
In any event, the story is quite different for homicide, as we shall see in
the next section.  For that important crime, the epidemic was to a
remarkable degree limited to black males, and their role has remained
elevated throughout the 1990s.
II. Homicide Victims and Offenders
An adequate description of the epidemic of youth violence requires a
detailed look at homicide.  While relatively rare, it is both the most
serious and the best documented of the violent crimes.  And the
homicide statistics suggest a somewhat different story about the
epidemic than the arrest statistics for violence.  The homicide epidemic
appears more intense and more narrowly concentrated with respect to
age and race than the epidemic of non-lethal youth violence.
There are two sources of detailed data on homicide (Wiersema, Loftin,
and McDowall 2000).  The Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) data
compiled by the FBI from law-enforcement agencies provide information
on individual homicides, including what is known about the victim, the
killer or killers, and the circumstances.  Because some agencies fail to
send in these reports, the SHR only captures 80-90 percent of all
homicides.  The other source, the mortality data from the National
Center for Health Statistics Vital Statistics Program, includes individual
records on all of the known homicides each year compiled from medical
examiners’ or coroners’ reports.  These data are useful as a check on the
SHR but lack information on circumstances of the homicides and
characteristics of the killers.
Figure 5 about here
Figure 5 depicts the trend in homicide-commission rates and
victimization rates in two age groups: adolescents (ages thirteen to10
seventeen) and young adults (ages eighteen to twenty-four).5  The
commission rates are not based on arrest data but rather are based on
the SHR data concerning demographic characteristics of suspects.  We
have adjusted these statistics for both the underreporting in the SHR,
and the fact that there are no suspects in some homicides.6  If the SHR
lists more than one suspect, we include only one of them.7  Thus our
approach assigns one and only one suspect to each homicide.  We prefer
this approach to the use of arrest data, which include multiple suspects
for some homicides and none for others.  One attractive consequence of
our approach is that the commission rates that we estimate for different
demographic groups are directly comparable to the victimization rates.
Figure 5 and those that follow are limited to males since they account for
most killings.  In particular, in 1998 81.5 percent of victims ages 13-17
were male, while 92.5 percent of suspects in this age range were male.
(The male percentages of victims and suspects for the 18-24 age group
are 86 and 93 respectively.)  Further, females were somewhat immune
                                      
5 The choice of 1976 as the first year in these charts is a reflection of SHR data
availability.
6 Data are missing for two reasons: Some law-enforcement agencies did not submit their
SHR data to the FBI, and some of the homicide reports that were submitted included no
information on the killer – presumably because the investigation had failed to yield an
arrest or even a description.  We correct for the failure to report by use of the Vital
Statistics Program data, as explained in Cook and Laub (1998).  For SHR homicides in
which no suspect is listed, we impute demographic characteristics based on the
characteristics of the victim.  Victims were placed in 16 categories based on sex, race
(black or not), and age (0-12, 13-17, 18-24, 25 and over).  The percentage distribution
of suspect characteristics over these same 16 categories was calculated for each of the
16 victim groups, for each year.  Those distributions were then treated as probability
distributions in imputing suspect characteristics for cases in which no suspect was
listed.   It should be noted that this imputation procedure is more elaborate than used
in Cook and Laub (1998); for that reason, and because we used somewhat different
population estimates, the estimates presented here are slightly different from those
presented in our earlier work.  This imputation strategy is slightly different from that
employed by Fox (2001).  He infers the demographic characteristics of unidentified
offenders from the known offender profiles based on age, race, and sex of the victim, the
state in which the homicide occurred, and the year of the offense.  Of course, as Maltz
points out, “unknown offenders are not necessarily representative of the knowns”
(1999, p. 39).  For a general overview of the quality of police data and efforts to impute
missing data see Maltz 1999.
7 The Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research SHR data set used
in the analysis (Study No. 3000vi) is a consolidated victim data set.  Where there is
more than one offender listed in the complementary offender data set (Study No.
3000of), only the characteristics of the first offender is listed in the victim data set.  The
concern is that the first offender listed is often chosen arbitrarily.  Nevertheless, Maltz
concludes that this is not a serious problem “since the great majority of homicides
consist of one victim and one offender” (1999, p. 34).11
from the epidemic, exhibiting a more muted increase through 1993, and
subsequent fall, in comparison with males.8
As seen in Figure 5, male homicide rates were highly volatile during the
epidemic period.  For adolescents, homicide commission rates more than
tripled between 1984 and 1993, while they doubled for young adults ages
18-24.  Victimization rates followed the same intertemporal pattern,
although at a lower level – youths are much more likely to kill than be
killed.  All rates fell sharply after 1994.
  Figures 6 and 7 about here
Figure 6 depicts the victimization and commission rates for the younger
age group, males only, for blacks and non-blacks.  Figure 7 provides the
same information for ages 18-24.  Both age groups exhibit the same
patterns as in Figure 5.  In addition, the figures make evident the vast
racial disparities in the average rates and the volatility of those rates over
the course of the epidemic.  For blacks ages 13-17, the homicide
commission rate increased by a factor of five, and victimization rates
increased by a factor of four.  The rates for non-blacks (predominately
whites) also increased during this period, but proportionately much less;
for adolescents, the increase in the rate of killing was by a factor of two,
and in victimization by two and a half.
Figure 8 about here
The remarkable run-up in homicide rates shown in these figures was
largely confined to youths.  As a logical result, the relative importance of
youths in the homicide picture increased.  Figure 8 shows that as a
percentage of all male killers, youths under 25 accounted for about 43
percent in the early 1980s; that figure climbed over 20 percentage points
by 1993, and has receded only marginally since then.  Thus three out of
every five homicides were committed by youths in 1998.
Table 2 about here
Given similar trends in commission and victimization rates, and the all-
too-vivid images of the recent school rampage shootings, it seems natural
to conclude that youths are killing each other.9  But the data suggest
                                      
8 The homicide-victimization rate for males ages 10-24 doubled between 1985 and
1993, while the rate only increased by one-third for females.  Following the peak in
1993, male and female rates declined by the same proportion through 1998.
9 The conventional wisdom conveyed in criminology and victimology textbooks is that
there is substantial age homogeneity among offenders and victims (see, e.g., Siegel 1995
and Fattah 1991).  For a recent study emphasizing age homogeneity in homicide see
Maltz (1998).12
substantial age disparities:  In 1998, for example, only 33 percent of
adolescent victims (ages 13-17) were killed by someone under age 18.  In
the other direction, only 28 percent of victims of adolescent killers were
under age 18 (Table 2).  While adolescents tend to fraternize and fight
with schoolmates and others in their age group, homicide is a different
story.
Table 3 about here
Tables 3 and 4 provide details regarding the age relationships between
victims and killers.  Starting with homicide victims ages 13 to 17 (Table
3), we see that the majority of the suspected killers were at least three
years older than the victim.  This pattern is evident before the epidemic,
during its peak, and during the decline.  While the age gap seems to have
narrowed during the epidemic suggesting that conflicts among age peers
became relatively more deadly, there has been some rebound since 1993.
Nevertheless, 38 percent of the adolescent victims in 1998 were killed by
someone five or more years older.
Table 4 about here
When we consider the ages of victims of adolescent killers a different
portrait emerges.  Table 4 indicates that most adolescent killers select
older victims, and half select victims who are at least five years older.
These patterns are suggestive of routine activities by violent adolescents
that involve a good deal of conflict with people who are substantially
older.   But there has been little change over the course of the epidemic
in the age distribution of those who are killed by adolescents, despite
enormous changes in the underlying homicide rates over this time
period.
Figure 9 about here
Figure 9 provides a look at the racial and ethnic composition of youth
homicide, this time focusing on victims.  Unfortunately the Vital
Statistics data do not include information on ethnicity before 1990, so it
is not possible before then to separate Hispanics from other whites.
As shown, black representation among male victims increased by about
13 percentage points in the early years of the epidemic and remained
near 60 percent thereafter.  Of the remaining 40 percent, over half were
white Hispanics during the 1990s.  Thus in recent years, while the
epidemic peaked and then receded, over 80 percent of youth homicide
victims have been blacks or Hispanics.
It is an open question whether non-Hispanic whites were affected by the
epidemic.  Youthful victimization rates of whites did increase during the13
late 1980s, but there is no precise way to apportion that increase
between Hispanic and non-Hispanic whites.  One approach is to compare
white homicide trends in states that had relatively large Hispanic
populations (the Southwest and Florida) with those that did not.  The
number of youthful white homicide victims nationwide increased by 37
percent between 1985 and 1993, but that increase was far from uniform;
states with a high concentration of Hispanics experienced a 51 percent
increase, while other states experienced only a 22 percent increase.10
To summarize, the homicide data confirm the existence of a great
epidemic of youth violence, demonstrating that it was even more intense
than indicated by trends in assault and robbery.  As noted in the
introduction, this epidemic was dominated by a particular demographic
group – black males under age 25.  The image that comes to mind is of a
flood in a canyon (Cook 1998).  That flood receded after 1993-4, but the
rates remained substantially higher by 1998 than prior to the epidemic’s
onset.   Further, the shift in the racial and age profile of homicide during
the run-up in homicide rates has not reverted during the decline.
Table 5 about here
While the epidemic was narrowly confined with respect to demographic
characteristics, it affected all regions of the nation.  Table 5 lists the 15
jurisdictions with the highest homicide counts for black males ages 10-
24 in the mid 1980s.  Every one of these jurisdictions experienced a
sharp increase in homicide rates for this group by the early 1990s; in 10
of these jurisdictions, the victimization rate more than doubled.  In all
but two of these jurisdictions (Cook County and Baltimore) the homicide
rate declined again by 1997-8.  The pervasiveness of this epidemic
dictates that any satisfactory explanation be national in scope.11
It is also of interest that the decline in overall homicide rates in the
1990s has not been uniform, but rather has been concentrated in the
largest cities.  The remarkable result has been a violation of one of the
empirical verities of criminology, namely that homicide rates tend to
increase with the population size of the city (Fox and Zawitz 2000;
Blumstein 2000).  By 1999 the average homicide rate for cities with
population of 250,000 to 500,000 was as high as for the largest cities.
                                      
10 States included in the former group are CA, AZ, NM, TX, FL, NV, OK, UT and CO.  In
1993, 74 percent of the 1,489 white male homicide victimizations in these states were
Hispanic, compared with 37 percent of the 1,130 such victimizations in the remaining
states.  The age group for these computations is 10-24.
11 This observation raises the question of what can be learned from international
comparisons, an issue we revisit in the last section of our paper.14
III. Cohort vs. Period Explanations
When an adolescent commits criminal homicide, it is a natural
presumption that the killer is a vicious, depraved, or psychologically
disturbed individual.  When an entire cohort of adolescents commits
homicide at an unusually high rate, then it seems reasonable to
conclude that such individuals are unusually prevalent in that cohort.
Explanations of this sort, that attribute trends in youth violence to
underlying trends in the character of the youths, have been popular
going back to the 1960s and probably long before (Cook 1985).   The
epidemic in youth violence that began in the mid 1980s was no
exception.  John DiIulio and his co-authors attributed that epidemic to
the fact that “America is now home to thickening ranks of juvenile
“super-predators” – radically impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters”
(Bennett, DiIulio and Walters 1996, p. 27), a trend caused by “’moral
poverty’ – children growing up without love, care, and guidance from
responsible adults” (p. 59).  In our earlier article (Cook and Laub 1998)
we pointed out a variety of ways in which this sort of explanation was
contradicted by the facts.12  Explanations that attributed rising violence
rates to the character of the youths nonetheless proved influential with
legislators, which in most states responded to the epidemic with more
punitive policies for juvenile crime (Feld 1998).
The latest claim for the “cohort” explanation of the epidemic is from
O’Brien, Stockard, and Isaacson (1999).  This article attempts to
distinguish between cohort and period effects in explaining age-specific
homicide-arrest rates over the years 1960-1995; one remarkable
conclusion is that the “period” effect was actually smaller in the 1990s
than in previous years, and the increase in the youth homicide-arrest
rate was largely the result of characteristics of the relevant cohorts.  They
arrive at this conclusion by use of a regression analysis.  The dependent
variable is the homicide-arrest rate, with data for each five-year interval
in the 1960-95 period, and for each five-year cluster of birth cohorts.
The independent variables include period and age indicators, and a two-
variable characterization of each birth-cohort cluster.  The two variables
are the relative size of the cohort and the percent of the cohort born out
of wedlock.  The latter increases sharply for the birth cohorts that were
on the front lines of the epidemic.  O’Brien and his colleagues find that
controlling for age and period, both cohort size and especially born-out-
of-wedlock percentage are positively and significantly related to age-
period-specific homicide rates.  Moreover, the effect of non-marital births
on homicide is considerably stronger compared with the effect of relative
cohort size.
                                      
12 John DiIulio has recanted his earlier views on this subject (Becker 2001).15
The claim that the period effect was relatively small during the early
1990s is counterintuitive to say the least, given that youth homicide
rates were at an all-time peak. The problem with their regression
specification is that it forces the period effects to have the same
proportional effect across all age groups.  That assumption is not
defensible in the recent epidemic, which, as we have seen, was
concentrated among the youngest cohorts.13  These same cohorts have
had much more typical rates of homicide involvement before and after
the epidemic, despite their high prevalence of out-of-wedlock births.  A
more flexible regression specification would be required to provide a valid
characterization of the recent history of youth violence.
Rather than a change in the intrinsic violence-proneness of youth
cohorts, it is more plausible that the upsurge in youth violence was the
result of a youth-specific period effect, which is to say that something
about the social, economic, or policy environment was more conducive to
lethal violence by youths in the early 1990s than in previous or
subsequent years.14   In particular, there is a strong case that the
introduction of crack cocaine in the mid-1980s in one city after another
provided a new source of deadly conflict, and the resources and
motivation for many young men to obtain guns (Blumstein 1995, 2000;
Cork 1999; Grogger and Willis 2000).  The subsequent drop in violence
was in this account the result of reduced conflict over crack distribution
as markets stabilized and became less lucrative.  But that explanation is
hypothetical and has not settled the matter.
A.  Cohort Explanations for the Crime Drop
With the sustained drop in youth crime rates since 1993, there is
renewed interest in cohort-type explanations.  What might have
happened to reduce the crime-proneness of recent cohorts?  The most
prominent hypothesis attributes a substantial portion of the crime drop
to abortion legalization.  Several states liberalized abortion restrictions in
the late 1960s and five legalized abortion by 1970.  In 1973 the Supreme
                                      
13 One implication of the analysis in O’Brien, Stockard and Isaacson (1999) is that
adolescent homicide rates should have continued to increase strongly during the late
1990s, since the non-marital birth rate continued to increase sharply during the
relevant years (i.e., 15  years earlier).  In fact the adolescent homicide rates have
declined both absolutely and relative to that of older cohorts.
14 Yet another possibility is that the epidemic increase and decline are the result of an
endogenous, self-generating process, rather than exogenous environmental effects.  For
example, if youth violence is in some sense contagious, then the volatility of rates could
be explained by the same internal dynamic as, say, a measles epidemic.  While the
possibility of contagion or other self-generating processes is entirely plausible in human
behavior (Gladwell 2000), and has been discussed in the context of gun carrying and
other aspects of youth violence (Hemenway et al. 1996; Fagan, Wilkinson, and Davies
2000), we limit our discussion to the more traditional cohort-period dichotomy.16
Court’s ruling in Roe v. Wade (410 U.S. 113 (1973)) declared state laws
prohibiting abortion to be unconstitutional.  The upsurge in legal
abortions could plausibly have reduced the criminal involvement of the
birth cohorts that were affected by these changes by reducing the size of
these cohorts, or, more interestingly, by reducing the prevalence of
children born into circumstances that placed them at risk for becoming
violent offenders.
There is strong evidence that abortion when legal is used selectively, in
the sense that women are more likely to abort pregnancies that would
otherwise result in the birth of children who would be unwanted or for
whom there would be few child-rearing resources available.  It is entirely
plausible, then, that unwanted children “at the margin of abortion”
would be more likely to be at risk for a variety of problems (Gruber,
Levine, and Staiger 1999; Brown and Eisenberg 1995), including violence
and crime.  Hence abortion legalization could have reduced the per capita
crime involvement for the cohorts that were affected.
Donohue and Levitt (2001) conclude from their analysis that abortion
legalization accounts for as much as half of the crime drop during the
1990s – a finding that has received considerable attention in the popular
press (Holloway 1999).  Their analysis exploits the large differences
among states in post-legalization abortion rates.  They find that states
with high abortion rates have enjoyed greater reductions in crime
beginning in the late 1980s (when the relevant cohorts are entering their
adolescent years) than states with lower abortion rates.   This is a robust
finding.  The conclusion has not gone unchallenged, however.  Joyce
(2001), using a somewhat different empirical strategy that focuses on the
contrast between states that legalized early with states that only legalized
after the Court's decision, concludes that there is no evidence that
abortion affected crime.
Note that there are two questions here.  The first question is whether
abortion legalization reduced crime rates relative to what they would
have been otherwise.  The second is whether abortion legalization is a
good candidate for explaining the observed drop in violent crime among
adolescents.  To answer yes to the second question, the answer to the
first question must be affirmative, and the crime-reducing effect of
legalization must not have been concealed by other historical (period)
effects. Without drawing a firm conclusion on that first and more
fundamental issue, we can nonetheless offer an opinion on the second
question.  The timing of the downturn is simply wrong for legalized
abortion to be the driving force.15  As shown in previous sections, the
                                      
15 Donohue and Levitt (2001) use 1991 as the start of the crime drop.  They write, “The
year 1991 represents a local maximum for all three of the crime measures.  Murder has17
adolescent arrest rate for property crime did not turn down until 1994,
about eight to eleven years after what we would expect if abortion
legalization were responsible.16  The violent-crime trends are still more
out of synch with the abortion explanation, since adolescent arrest rates
and other measures of violence involvement were actually increasing
through 1993.  Further, the increases were greatest for black youths,
even though a larger percentage of pregnancies by black women were
aborted following legalization than for women of other races (Levine et al.
1996).17
The abortion-legalization hypothesis is not the only “cohort” explanation
for the crime drop.  Another focuses on the reduction in serum lead
levels in young children, resulting in part from the ban on use of lead
paint in 1978, the ban of lead in gasoline in 1982, and regulations on
lead in drinking water and consumer products.  Epidemiological evidence
suggests that ingesting even small quantities of lead may damage
children in a variety of ways, including causing a reduction in IQ and
emotional development (Nevin 2000).  A recent study found a correlation
across counties between lead in the air and homicide rates (Stretesky
and Lynch 2001).  Nationwide, serum lead levels in young children have
declined at least since 1980 (Lutter and Mader 2001), suggesting the
possibility that violence rates will decline as cohorts that have been less
exposed reach adolescence and beyond.  To illustrate this point, Nevin
argues that “if the association between gasoline lead and social behavior
continues into the future, then violent crime and unwed teen pregnancy
could show dramatic declines over the next 5 to 10 years” (2000, p. 19).
Yet while the “lead” hypothesis is certainly intriguing, and may, like
liberalized abortion, have an effect on violence and other behavior, it does
cannot account for the movements in cohort-specific homicide rates that
have been observed since 1985.
                                                                                                                 
fallen by 40 percent and the other two categories are down by more than 30 percent”
(2001, p. 392).  They also argue that ages 18 to 24 are crime prone years with age 20
being the peak of the age-crime profile.  Thus, in 1991, the first cohort affected by Roe
v. Wade would be 17-18 years old.  In the early-legalizing states, the first cohort
affected by legalized abortion would be 20-21 years old (2001, pp. 393-394).  But for
these age groups, we have seen that the homicide rate did not turn down until after
1993, so these cohorts were in fact two years older than that.
16 The “seven to ten year” range is based on two dates for the liberalization of abortion:
1970, when California, New York, and several other states legalized abortion, and 1973.
when the rest of the country legalized abortion.  Then thirteen year olds in 1983 (given
the early legalizers) or 1986 (given the later ones) should have had reduced crime
involvement.
17 It should be noted that Donohue and Levitt recognize that the “dampening effect” of
abortion on crime “can be outweighed in the short term by factors that stimulate crime.
Elevated youth homicide rates in this period [late 1980s and early 1990s] appear to be
clearly linked to the rise of crack and the easy availability of guns (2001, p. 395).”18
Figure 10 about here
Any “cohort” account of why violence rates have been dropping requires
demonstration of a downward trend in violence involvement from one
birth cohort to the next.  To explore this possibility, we analyze homicide
victimization rates for black males born in 1969, 1974, 1977, and 1981.
(As we have seen, victimization rates have been highly correlated over
time with rates of commission, and can be measured more accurately.)
Figure 10 depicts annual victimization rates for each of these cohorts
relative to average same-age victimization rates for a baseline period,
1976-1984.  (This baseline period was chosen because it preceded the
epidemic.)  For example, the 1990-point on the graph for the 1969 birth
cohort is the ratio of the homicide-victimization rate for 21-year olds in
1990 to the average victimization rate for 21-year olds during the
baseline period.  In that sense we have controlled for the effect of age,
revealing the period effects and differences among the cohorts.  If the age
profiles for these four cohorts had been similar to the age profile during
the baseline period, then all four lines would be flat and equal to 1.0
throughout.
What the data in Figure 10 reveal, however, is that all four cohorts have
elevated rates during the epidemic period with peaks in the early 1990s.
Note that the three younger cohorts were born after abortion was
legalized, but there is no indication that they have been less likely to
experience violence than the oldest cohort (born in 1969, before
legalization); indeed, all three of these later cohorts have higher ratios
than the 1969 birth cohort throughout the period depicted here.  If there
is a trend from one cohort to the next, it appears to be in the direction of
greater violence rather than less.18  In any case the period effects
dominate this picture.19
These results do not rule out the possibility that abortion legalization or
other influences on the violence-proneness of youth cohorts have had an
ameliorative effect on youth violence rates, but do indicate that that
effect, if it exists, has been well concealed by historical events.   The
evidence against the “super-predator” explanation for the upside of the
epidemic is compelling (Cook and Laub 1998), and we find the evidence
                                      
18 Another possibility is that the “period” effects were strongest for adolescents and
declined across the age spectrum.  That possibility accords with the economics of the
crack trade, which recruited adolescents to sell crack in public places, thus putting
them in harm’s way.  An “age-differential period effect” cannot be logically distinguished
from a trend in cohort effects.
19 Again, it is very difficult to see how the period effect for homicide could be declining
from 1970 to 1995, as the regression results in O’Brien, Stockard and Isaacson (1999,
p. 1078) suggest.19
against a cohort explanation for any substantial portion of the downside
just as compelling.
B. Gun Use During the Crime Drop
On the upside, the epidemic of youth homicide was entirely a gun-
homicide epidemic – non-gun rates remained essentially unchanged.
The conventional explanation attributes the increase in gun use to the
introduction of crack cocaine, which recruited youths into the business
and provided them with the means and motivation to acquire guns.  That
by itself would not explain why gun killings increased in domestic
arguments and routine altercations, unless the habit of gun carrying
spread beyond the drug trade as a matter of fashion or self-defense
(Fagan and Wilkinson 1998).
Several commentators have suggested that the way out of the epidemic
has been the same as the way in, with declining gun use leading the way
(Blumstein 2001).  But the data indicate that non-gun homicide rates
have declined along with gun rates, an important difference with the
upside of the epidemic.  At the peak of the epidemic in 1993, the gun
percentage in homicide victimization had reached 90 percent for males
ages 13 to 17, and 88 percent for those ages 18 to 24.  By 1997 each of
those percentages had dropped by just one point.
Figure 11 about here
Figure 11 places recent trends in historical context, showing that the gun
percentage in male-youth-homicide victimization increased about 17
percentage points during the period 1985 to 1993, and has remained
near that very high level for the first few years of the drop.  This figure
also includes the trend line for the gun percentage in homicide
commission by youths, which follows the same pattern but at a lower
level.20  Thus it appears that guns remained prevalent in deadly conflicts
involving at-risk youths even while such conflicts were becoming less
common.
Table 6 about here
                                      
20 Cook (1991) found that the gun percentage in homicide was closely related to the
physical strength and robustness of the victims.  Thus the gun percentage is higher for
males than females, and higher for young adults than for children or older people.
Confirming the importance of the victim characteristics in influencing weapon type, we
find that when young men kill each other, they are as likely to use a gun as are women
or older men who kill young men.  But when young men kill less robust victims, they
(like other killers) are less likely to use a gun.20
Some detail is provided in Table 6, which gives the percentage gun use in
homicide by circumstance for three periods.  On the upside of the
epidemic, the prevalence of guns increased sharply in all types of
homicide, including domestic, gang-related, felony-related, and so forth.
(Technically the "domestic" category is not a circumstance as designated
by the SHR.  That line in Table 6 includes all cases of killings within the
family, regardless of SHR-designated circumstance.)   After the peak, the
gun percentage dropped very little except in domestic cases, and for two
categories -- felony-type and gang-related -- it actually increased.  Thus
the “hangover” from the epidemic appears to include a broader access to
guns by violent youths.
IV. Concluding Thoughts
The epidemic of youth violence began in the mid 1980s, peaked in 1993-
1994, and had subsided to near the original levels by 1999.  This
volatility has provided a profound challenge to criminologists.  The
scientific effort to explain why some individuals or groups or
communities or nations have higher violence rates than others is well
advanced, but provides little guidance to understanding how, for
example, the homicide rate for black adolescents nationwide could triple
in just a few years.
James Q. Wilson recently observed that "[s]ocial scientists have made
great gains in explaining why some people are more likely than others to
commit crimes but far smaller gains in understanding a nation's crime
rate” (in press).  As Wilson points out, the two tasks are not the same
thing at all.21  Yet there is a natural presumption among many
criminologists that the first place to seek an explanation for a change in
the nation's crime rate is in changes in the composition of the
population.  More crime suggests more crime-prone people; a vast
increase in youth violence of the sort experienced in the late 1980s
suggests a correspondingly vast increase in the number of violence-prone
youth.  And similarly for the downside.
As we have seen, this sort of "cohort" explanation for the epidemic
increase or the subsequent decline has not squared with the facts.  The
same birth cohorts that appeared quite typical in their violence
involvement before and after the epidemic were not at all typical during
the peak years of the epidemic.  The evidence seems to rule out cohort-
type explanations as the primary source of the observed volatility.  That
                                      
21 Levitt and Lochner document a variety of determinants of juvenile crime from their
multifaceted study, but conclude that "None of these determinants of crime ...do a
particularly good job of explaining the time-series pattern of juvenile crime over the last
two decades” (2001, p. 371).21
does not mean that cohort size, being born out of wedlock, abortion
availability, serum blood levels, and so forth are irrelevant to crime and
violence rates.  It does mean that such explanations cannot account for
this epidemic.
That narrows the search to "period" or environmental effects as the
primary driving force.  We have attempted to narrow the search still
further by documenting the structure of violence rates over time.  The
second most remarkable feature of the epidemic (after the sheer
amplitude of the rate swings) has been the extent to which it was
narrowly channeled demographically.  Hispanic and most especially
black males under age 25 did most of the additional killing and provided
most of the additional victims.  Young females and non-Hispanic whites,
and adults in their 30s or older, were left on the sidelines for the most
part.  Yet within its demographic confines, the epidemic was national in
scope.  The appeal of what has become the conventional explanation, the
introduction of crack cocaine in one city after another across the nation,
is that it has the right timing and can accommodate all these facts.
To further limit the domain of acceptable explanations, it may be of value
to compare trends in the U.S. with that in other countries, especially
Canada and Europe.  For example, Pfeiffer (1998), in a review of youth-
violence trends in Europe, concludes that ten European countries
experienced increases in youth violence beginning in the early to mid-
1980s, suggesting that the U.S. experience is not unique in that respect
(see also Killias and Aebi 2000).  The shared trend may call into question
the crack-market explanation for the U.S. epidemic, and in any event
encourages a search for other underlying causal factors that are
operating in parallel.
A consensus explanation for the downside of the epidemic has not yet
emerged.  We do know that the downside has not been a mirror image of
the upside.  The "way out" has not been the same as the "way in" with
respect to sex, race and ethnicity, and perhaps most important,
weapons.  In each of those dimensions, the post-peak period has seen
more balanced declines in the homicide rates.  As a result, the youth
homicide rate in 1998 was substantially lower than 1993 but was similar
in composition with respect to sex, race and ethnicity, and weapon type.
Thus the high concentration among minorities and males, and the
prevalence of guns, may be long-lasting hangovers from the epidemic.
Also relevant in seeking a satisfactory explanation for the downside is
that the declining rate for youths occurs in a context of overall declines
in homicide.  While the youth-violence epidemic was bucking the
prevailing trend and hence requires a "youth only" explanation, that is
not the case for the downside, where it may reasonably be supposed that22
the youths are responding to the same environmental factors associated
with law enforcement, the economy, cultural change, routine activities,
drug and gun markets, and so forth as are older adults.  But that
observation does not provide much leverage, since the relative
contribution of these factors to adult crime has not been well established
(Blumstein and Wallman 2000), and is in any event likely to be different
for youths than adults.  For example, while Spelman (2001) estimates
that the incapacitation effect of increased imprisonment could account
for 25 percent of the overall crime drop, it is unlikely that incarceration
of juvenile offenders played such an important role.
For policymakers the lesson here is not very reassuring.  If cohort
characteristics reliably predicted violence involvement, then future
trends in violence rates might at least be foreseeable.22  At the most basic
level the size of cohorts have long been used to predict rates of crime and
violence, on the reasonable assumption that relatively large cohorts
passing through the crime-prone years of adolescence and young
adulthood will be associated with relatively high crime rates for the
nation as a whole (Fox 2000).  But even this common-sense observation
has proven of little use in projecting violence rates, simply because the
volatility in per-capita commission rates has dominated the picture for
youths.  In our earlier paper, we reported a negative correlation for the
period 1965-1995 between the number of people ages 13-17 and the
number of homicides in this age group (Cook and Laub 1998, p. 59).
Unfortunately for forecasting purposes, demography is not destiny, and
forecasts based on demographics and an assumption of constant age-
specific offending rates have been notable for their large errors.23  We
agree with Land and McCall (2001), who suggest that analysts have
tended to place too much faith in demographic-based forecasts, and
should acknowledge the great uncertainty inherent in such efforts.
Forecast uncertainty of course increases as we attempt to look farther
into the future.  But our understanding of crime trends may improve if
we look farther into the past.  If we define the problem as understanding
the crime drop during the 1990s, then that encourages a focus on policy
innovations and other changes during that period.  A longer historical
perspective on crime “booms” and “busts” may encourage a deeper
analysis (LaFree 1998a, 1998b, 1999, and 2001).  For example, the most
recent epidemic of youth violence was closely tied to a parallel epidemic
of crack cocaine.  If we look back to the 1960s, or all the way back to
                                      
22 For example, Donohue and Levitt conclude that, “all else equal, legalized abortion will
account for persistent declines of 1 percent a year in crime over the next two decades”
(2001, p. 415).
23 For documentation and discussion, see Zimring (1998), Levitt (1999), Steffensmeier
and Harer (1999) and Cohen and Land (1987).23
Prohibition, then the question arises of how other epidemics of illicit drug
use have influenced violence rates, and why the market for some drugs,
particularly marijuana, appears to be more benign than for others,
including heroin, powder cocaine, and crack.24
We may also gain additional insight by casting a broader net, considering
other forms of problematic behavior besides crime and violence.  The fact
that teen childbearing began a sustained decline after a peak in 1991,
and that teen suicide rates declined substantially after 1994, invites
speculation that there is more than mere coincidence with the downward
trend in violence. If teenagers as a group became more hopeful and
future-oriented over the course of this decade, that would account for a
variety of healthy trends -- but leave us with a new question.
                                      
24 Fagan, Zimring, and Kim point out that “homicide and drug epidemics have been
closely phased, both temporally and spatially, in New York and nationwide, for nearly
thirty years. Homicide peaks in 1972, 1979, and 1991 mirror three drug epidemics:
heroin; cocaine hydrochloride (powder); and crack cocaine.” (1998, p. 1306).24
References
Becker, Elizabeth. 2001. “As Ex-Theorist on Young ‘Superpredators,’
Bush Aide Has Regrets.”  New York Times A19, Feb. 9.
Bennett, William J., John J. DiIulio, and John P. Walters. 1996. Body
Count: Moral Poverty and How to Win America’s War Against Crime and
Drugs. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Blumstein, Alfred.  1995.  “Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug
Industry.”  Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 86:10-36.
Blumstein, Alfred. 2000. “Disaggregating the Violence Trends.”  In The
Crime Drop in America, edited by Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Blumstein, Alfred. 2001. “Why is Crime Falling? – Or is It?” Perspectives
on Crime and Justice Lecture Series.  Washington, DC: National Institute
of Justice.
Blumstein, Alfred and Joel Wallman, editors.  2000. The Crime Drop in
America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Brown, Sarah S. and Leon Eisenberg. 1995. Unintended Pregnancy and
the Well-Being of Children and Families.  Washington, DC: National
Academy Press.
Cohen, Lawrence E. and Kenneth C. Land. 1987.  “Age Structure and
Crime.” American Sociological Review 52:170-183.
Cook, Philip J. 1985.  “Is Robbery Becoming More Violent? An Analysis of
Robbery Murder Trends since 1968.”  Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology 76:480-89.
Cook, Philip J.  1991.  "The Technology of Personal Violence."  In Crime
and Justice: A Review of Research, Vol. 14, edited by Michael Tonry.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1-72.
Cook, Philip J. 1998.  "The Epidemic of Youth Gun Violence."  In
Perspectives on Crime and Justice: 1997-1998 Lecture Series.
Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, NCJ172851:107-116.
Cook, Philip J. and John H. Laub. 1986. “The (Surprising) Stability of
Youth Crime Rates.” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 2:265-77.25
Cook, Philip J. and John H. Laub. 1998. “The Unprecedented Epidemic
in Youth Violence.” In Youth Violence: Crime and Justice: A Review of
Research, vol. 24, edited by Michael Tonry and Mark H. Moore. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 27-64.
Cork, Daniel.  1999.  “Examining Space-Time Interaction in City-Level
Homicide Data: Crack Markets and the Diffusion of Guns Among Youth."
Journal of Quantitative Criminology 15:379-406.
Donohue, John J. III and Steven D. Levitt. 2001. “The Impact of Legalized
Abortion on Crime.” Quarterly Journal of Economics CXVI: 379-420.
Fagan, Jeffrey, Deanna Wilkinson, and Garth Davies.  2000.  "Social
Contagion of Youth Violence." Presented at Urban Seminar Series on
Children's Health and Safety, Urban Poverty Research Program, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
Fagan, Jeffrey and Deanna L. Wilkinson. 1998. “Guns, Youth Violence,
and Social Identity in Inner Cities.” In Youth Violence: Crime and Justice:
A Review of Research, vol. 24, edited by Michael Tonry and Mark H.
Moore. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 105-188.
Fagan, Jeffrey, Franklin E. Zimring, and June Kim. 1998. “Declining
Homicide in New York City: A Tale of Two Trends.” Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminology 88:1277-1323.
Fattah, Ezzat A. 1991.  Understanding Criminal Victimization: An
Introduction to Theoretical Victimology.  Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice
Hall Canada.
Federal Bureau of Investigation.  1966-2000.  Crime in the United States.
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.
Feld, Barry C. 1998. “Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems’ Response
to Youth Violence.”  In Youth Violence: Crime and Justice: A Review of
Research, vol. 24, edited by Michael Tonry and Mark H. Moore. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 189-261.
Fox, James Alan. 2000. “Demographics and U.S. Homicide.” In The Crime
Drop in America, edited by Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman.  New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Fox, James Alan. 2001. “National and State Level Gun and Total
Homicide Victimization and Offending Rates by Age, Sex, and Race,
1976-99.” Boston, MA: Northeastern University.26
Fox, James Alan and Marianne W. Zawitz. 2000. Homicide Trends in the
United States: 1998 Update.  Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice
Statistics NCJ 179767.
Gladwell, Malcolm. 2000.  The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make
a Big Difference.  Boston: Little Brown and Company.
Grogger, Jeffrey and Michael Willis.  2000. “The Emergence of Crack
Cocaine and the Rise of Urban Crime Rates.” Review of Economics and
Statistics 82: 519-529.
Gruber, Jonathan, Phillip B. Levine, and Donald Staiger.  1999.
"Abortion Legalization and Child Living Circumstances: Who Is the
'Marginal Child?'"  Quarterly Journal of Economics CXIV: 263-291.
Hemenway, David, Deborah Prothrow-Stith, Jack M. Bergstein,
Roseanna Ander, and Bruce P. Kennedy.  1996.  "Gun Carrying Among
Adolescents."  Law & Contemporary Problems Winter: 39-54.
Holloway, Marguerite.  1999.  "The Aborted Crime Wave?"  Scientific
American 281:23-4.
Joyce, Ted. 2001. “Did Legalized Abortion Lower Crime?” New York:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Killias, Martin and Marcelo F. Aebi. 2000. “Crime Trends in Europe from
1990 to 1996: How Europe Illustrates the Limits of the American
Experience.” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 8:43-63.
LaFree, Gary. 1998a. Losing Legitimacy: Street Crime and the Decline of
Social Institutions in America. Boulder, CO: Westview.
LaFree, Gary. 1998b. “Social Institutions and the Crime “Bust” of the
1990s.”  Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 88:1325-1368.
La Free, Gary. 1999. “Declining Violent Crime Rates in the 1990s:
Predicting Crime Booms and Busts.” Annual Review of Sociology 25:145-
168.
LaFree, Gary. 2001. “Explaining the Crime Bust of the 1990s: A Review
Essay of The Crime Drop in America.” Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology, forthcoming.27
Land, Kenneth C. and Patricia L. McCall. 2001. “The Indeterminacy of
Forecasts of Crime Rates and Juvenile Offenses.” In Juvenile Crime,
Juvenile Justice, edited by Joan McCord, Cathy Spatz Widom, and Nancy
A. Crowell.  Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Levine, Phillip B., D. Staiger, Thomas J. Kane, and D. J. Zimmerman.
1996.  “Roe v. Wade and American Fertility.”  National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No. 5615, June.
Levitt, Steven D. 1999. “The Limited Role of Changing Age Structure in
Explaining Aggregate Crime Rates.” Criminology 37:581-598.
Levitt, Steven D. and Lance Lochner.  2001.  “The Determinants of
Juvenile Crime.”  In Risky Behavior among Youths: An Economic Analysis,
edited by Jonathan Gruber.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 327-
374.
Lutter, Randall and Elizabeth Mader. 2001.  “Litigating Lead-Based Paint
Hazards: Is It a Solution?”  Prepared for the American Enterprise
Institute-Brookings Institution Join Center Conference on Regulation
through Litigation, April 26.
Maltz, Michael D. 1998. “Visualizing Homicide: A Research Note.” Journal
of Quantitative Criminology 14:397-410.
Maltz, Michael D. 1999. Bridging Gaps in Police Crime Data. Washington,
DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Nevin, Rick.  2000.  “How Lead Exposure Relates to Temporal Changes in
IQ, Violent Crime, and Unwed Pregnancy.”  Environmental Research
Section A 83:1-22.
O’Brien, Robert M. 1999. “Measuring the Convergence/Divergence of
“Serious Crime” Arrest Rates for Males and Females: 1960-1995.”
Journal of Quantitative Criminology 15:97-114.
O’Brien, Robert M., Jean Stockard, and Lynne Isaacson.  1999.  “The
Enduring Effects of Cohort Characteristics on Age-Specific Homicide
Rates, 1960-1995.” American Journal of Sociology 104:1061-95.
Pfeiffer, Christian. 1998. “Juvenile Crime and Violence in Europe.” In
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, Vol. 23, edited by Michael
Tonry.  Chicago, University of Chicago Press.28
Rosenfeld, Richard. 2000. “Patterns in Adult Homicide: 1980-1995.”  In
The Crime Drop in America, edited by Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Siegel, Larry J. 1995. Criminology.  Minneapolis: West Publishing Co.
Spelman, William. 2001.  “The Limited Importance of Prison Expansion.”
In The Crime Drop in America, edited by Alfred Blumstein and Joel
Wallman. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Steffensmeier, Darrell and Miles D. Harer.  1999. “Making Sense of
Recent U.S. Crime Trends, 1980 to 1996/1998: Age Composition Effects
and Other Explanations.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency
36:235-274.
Stretesky, Paul B. and Michael J. Lynch.  2001.  “The Relationship
Between Lead Exposure and Homicide.”  Archives of Pediatric and
Adolescent Medicine 155: 579-582.
Tonry, Michael and Mark H. Moore, editors. 1998. Youth Violence: Crime
and Justice A Review of Research, Volume 24.  Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration,
Bureau of the Census.  1966-2000.  Statistical Abstract of the United
States.    Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.
Wiersema, Brian, Colin Loftin, and David McDowall. 2000. “A
Comparison of Supplementary Homicide Reports and National Vital
Statistics System Homicide Estimates for U.S. Counties.” Homicide
Studies 4:317-340.
Wilson, James Q. In press. “Crime and Public Policy.”  In Crime, 2nd ed.,
edited by James Q. Wilson and Joan Petersilia.  San Francisco: ICS
Press.
Zimring, Franklin E. 1998. American Youth Violence.  New York: Oxford
University Press.29
TABLE 1
Juvenile Perpetrators in Serious Violent Crime, Rates per
1,000
NCVS Data, 1975-99
Commission Rate by Perpetrators Ages 12-17,
No. of Crimes (Thousands)/No. of Youths (Millions)
Rate per 1,000
Period Excluding Unknowns Apportioning Unknowns
1975 – 79 505/25.0 = 20.2 599/25.0 = 24.0
1980 – 84 449/22.3 = 20.1 540/22.3 = 24.2
1985 – 89 376/21.0 = 17.9 464/21.0 = 22.1
1990 – 94 573/20.9 = 27.4 721/20.9 = 34.5
1995 – 99 471/22.8 = 20.6 524/22.8 = 23.0
Source:  Unpublished data from National Crime Victimization Survey (1975 –
1999), provided by Michael Rand.
Note:  NCVS = National Crime Victimization Survey.  All statistics are for the
crimes of rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.  The NCVS statistics are based
on respondents’ reports of the age of the perpetrators.  Crimes in which there
are multiple perpetrators are counted as one.30
TABLE 2
Age Patterns of Homicide Victimization and Commission:
SHR Data, 1994 and 1998
Percent Distribution
of Victims
Ages 13 – 17*
Percent Distribution
of Killers








<13 .5 .7 <13 5.8 6.0
13 – 17 37.2 32.1 13 – 17 25.9 22.1
18 – 24 47.2 46.1 18 – 24 30.0 31.1
>24 15.2 21.1 >24 39.4 40.8
N 1,036 549 N 1,489 795
Source:  FBI, Supplementary Homicide Reports for 1994 and 1998.
Note: SHR = Supplementary Homicide Reports.  Excludes homicides not
reported by local police agencies to the FBI as part of the SHR.  Excludes
negligent manslaughter and justifiable homicide.  The total percent distribution
for victims is 100.0 and for killers is 100.0.
*There were an additional 535 victims ages 13-17 in 1994 and 304
victims in 1998, for whom no suspects were listed.  The SHR's victim data set
lists no more than one suspect.
+For 8 of the cases in 1994 and 14 in 1998 in which the suspect was 13-
17 years old, the age of the victim was unknown.  These cases were excluded.31
TABLE 3
Age Relationships between Victim and Killer
Victims Ages 13–17
1985, 1993, and 1998













Source: FBI, Supplementary Homicide Reports (1985, 1993, 1998)
Note:  SHR = Supplementary Homicide Reports. Excludes homicides not
reported by local police agencies to the FBI as part of the SHR.  Excludes
negligent manslaughter and justifiable homicide.  Excludes cases in which no
suspect was listed.32
Table 4












Killer five or more
years younger  than
victim
55 52 51
Source: FBI, Supplementary Homicide Reports for 1985, 1993, and 1998.
Note: SHR = Supplementary Homicide Reports. Excludes homicides not reported by local police
agencies to the FBI as part of the SHR.  Excludes negligent manslaughter and justifiable
homicide.  Excludes cases in which no suspect was listed.33
Table 5
Homicide Victimization Rates for Black Males age 10–24
15 Large Counties, Three Periods.






























New York City 213 79.4 334 124.9 133 50.8
Los Angeles
County, CA
168 127.5 221 183.4 121 100.5
Wayne County, MI 161 146.7 199 191.3 122 117.0
Cook County, IL 144 78.6 238 142.8 279 170.8
Baltimore (city),
MD
62 109.3 109 229.2 111 245.7
Philadelphia
County, PA
41 49.8 121 168.6 106 155.3
Orleans Parish, LA 40 90.8 139 346.6 82 207.7
Harris County, TX 38 50.9 91 125.4 38 49.0
St. Louis (city), MO 36 133.8 101 455.1 35 160.0
Dallas County, TX 36 75.1 82 166.8 48 88.8
District of
Columbia
34 65.3 182 512.0 93 389.2
Dade County, FL 34 73.2 56 107.3 47 82.3
Fulton County, GA 28 66.7 93 149.6 32 67.8
Shelby County, TN 28 56.8 61 125.3 37 73.1
Cuyahoga County,
OH
27 54.9 50 123.8 20 46.8
Total for Period 1,086 2,047 1,303
% of US Total 56.1 47.0 43.5
Source:  National Center for Health Statistics (1984-86, 1991-94, 1997-98).  U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1984-86.  County populations for 1991-94 and 1997-98 from
CDC Wonder database.34
Table 6.
Homicide Gun Percentage by Circumstance
 Male Killers ages 13–24
1982–85, 1990–92, 1997–98
Percent With Guns
1982 – 85 1990 – 92 1997 – 98
Circumstances
   Family and
     intimates 52.0 55.3 37.0
Felony type 53.5 73.1 79.4
Brawls and
  arguments 56.6 73.6 71.2
Gang related 78.9 90.5 93.4
Other known
  circumstances 50.3 69.8 62.7
Unknown
circumstances 56.8 77.6 70.2
All circumstances
54.7 72.3 70.7
Source:  FBI, Supplementary Homicide Reports (1982-85, 1990-92, 1997-98)
Note:  SHR = Supplementary Homicide Reports. Excludes homicides not
reported by local police agencies to the FBI as part of the SHR.  Excludes
negligent manslaughter and justifiable homicide.  “Family and Intimates” is not
a circumstance, but was defined to supercede other categories in this list.35
Table A1
Juvenile Perpetrators in Serious Violent Crime: Percentage of





NCVS Data, Victimization in











1975 – 79 12 25 23
1980 – 84 10 23 21
1985 – 89 9 22 20
1990 – 94 13 27 25
1995 – 99 13 27 25
  Source: FBI data is from Crime in the United States (1976 – 2000).
Unpublished NCVS was provided by Michael Rand, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
  Note:  NCVS = National Crime Victimization Survey.  Percentages are for the
crimes of rape robbery, aggravated assault, and (for the FBI statistics only)
criminal homicide.  The NCVS statistics are based on respondents’ reports of
the age of the perpetrators.  In the case when there was more than one
perpetrator in the incident, the incident was included in the "juvenile" category
if there was at least one perpetrator under 18.36
Appendix
Source Information for Data Used to Generate Figures
Homicide:
ICPSR 2001a:  FBI, Supplementary Homicide Reports, 1976-1998.
Obtained from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research web site; www.icpsr.umich.edu, Study No. 3000, dataset
da3000vi.
Vital Statistics-Mortality:
ICPSR 2001b-National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics
Mortality, 1976-1991. Obtained from the Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research web site; www.icpsr.umich.edu, Study No.
7632, Mortality Detail files 1968-1991,datasets da7632.y76 to
da7632.y91.
ICPSR 2001c:  National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics
Mortality, 1992. Obtained from the Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research web site; www.icpsr.umich.edu, Study No.
6546, Multiple Causes of Death 1992, dataset da6546.
ICPSR 2001d:  National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics
Mortality, 1993. Obtained from the Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research web site; www.icpsr.umich.edu, Study No.
6320, Multiple Causes of Death 1993, dataset da6320.
ICPSR 2001e:  National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics
Mortality, 1994. Obtained from the Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research web site; www.icpsr.umich.edu, Study No.
2201, Multiple Causes of Death 1994, dataset da2201.
ICPSR 2001f:  National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics
Mortality, 1995. Obtained from the Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research web site; www.icpsr.umich.edu, Study No.
2392, Multiple Causes of Death 1995, dataset da2392.
ICPSR 2001g:  National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics
Mortality, 1996. Obtained from the Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research web site; www.icpsr.umich.edu, Study No.
2702, Multiple Causes of Death 1996, dataset da2702.
CDC 2001a:  Centers for Disease Control, National Center for Injury
Prevention and Control, WISQARS database37
www.cdc.gov/ncipc/wisqars/; U.S. gun and total homicide statistics,
1997-98.
CDC 2001b: Centers for Disease Control, National Center for Injury
Prevention and Control, WISQARS database
www.cdc.gov/ncipc/wisqars/; U.S. gun and total homicide statistics,
Hispanic males 13-24, 1990-98.
Population Estimates:
USDC 2001:  U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau,
Quarterly Population estimates, by single year of age, race and sex,
1980-89.  Data obtained from
www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/nat_80s_detail.html, files
e8081rqi.zip through e8990rqi.zip.
CDC 2001c:  Centers for Disease Control, National Center for Injury
Prevention and Control, WISQARS database
www.cdc.gov/ncipc/wisqars/; Population totals, black, Hispanic and
total U.S. males 13-24, 1990-98.38
CAPTIONS FOR FIGURES
Fig. 1.  Arrest rates for youths ages 13-17. Source: FBI (1966-2000); U.S.
Department of Commerce (1966-2000). Arrest rates have been adjusted
to account for incomplete coverage by the Uniform Crime Reports.
Fig. 2.  Age profiles of male violence arrest rates: 1985, 1994, and 1999.
Source: FBI (1986, 1995, 2000); US Department of Commerce (1966-
2000).  Arrest rates have been adjusted to account for incomplete
coverage by the Uniform Crime Reports.
Fig. 3.  Arrest rates for aggravated assault and robbery of arrestees
under 18, 1994 and 1999, by sex and race.
 Source: FBI (1995, 2000); US Department of Commerce (1966-2000).
Arrest rates have been adjusted to account for incomplete coverage by
the Uniform Crime Reports.
Fig. 4.  Juvenile arrest rate ratios for violence, 1965-1999: Males and
females, blacks and whites.  Source: FBI (1966-2000);  U.S. Department
of Commerce (1966-2000).
Fig. 5.  Homicide-commission and victimization rates, males only:  Ages
13-17 and 18-24, 1976-1998.  Source:  ICPSR (2001a-f); CED (2001a).
See Appendix for details.   Adjusted for unknowns and underreporting by
police to match homicide counts in the Vital Statistics.
Fig. 6.  Homicide commission and victimization rates for black and non-
black males ages 13-17, 1976-1998.  Source:  ICPSR (2001 a-f); CDC
(2001a).  See Appendix for details.  Adjusted for unknowns and
underreporting by police to match homicide counts in the Vital Statistics.
Fig. 7.  Homicide commission and victimization rates for black and non-
black males ages 18-24, 1976-1998.  Source:  ICPSR (2001 a-f); CDC
(2001a).  See Appendix for details.  Adjusted for unknowns and
underreporting by police to match homicide counts in the Vital Statistics.
Fig. 8.  Age distribution of suspected male killers, 1976-1998.  Source:
ICPSR (2001a). See Appendix for details.
Fig. 9.  Race and ethnicity of male victims, ages 13-24: Black and/or
Hispanic, 1976-1998.  Source:  ICPSR (2001 a-f).  See Appendix for
details.39
Fig. 10.  Ratio of homicide-victimization rates to pre-epidemic base rate
(1976-1984), four birth cohorts of black males.  Source: ICPSR (2001a-f);
CDC (2001a,c).  See Appendix for details.
Fig. 11.  Percent gun use in homicides involving males ages 13-24, 1976-
1998.  Source:  ICPSR (2001 a-f); CDC (2001a).  See Appendix for details.
Fig. A1.  Arrests by age group as percent of total, 1999.  Source: FBI
(2000)
Fig. A2.  Arrests for juveniles under 18 as percent of total, 1965-1999.



















































PropertyFigure 2. Age Profiles of Male Violence Arrest Rates














































1985Figure 3. Arrest Rates for Aggravated Assault & Robbery of 
Arrestees Under 18, 1994 and 1999 by Sex and Race
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MalesFigure 4. Juvenile Arrest Rate Ratios for Violence, 

































Black-White RatioFigure 5. Homicide-commission and Victimization Rates,  


































Victimization RateFigure 6. Homicide Commission and Victimization Rates for 

























































Victimization RateFigure 7. Homicide Commission and Victimization Rates for 

















































































































Under 18Figure 9. Race and Ethnicity of Male Victims, Ages 13-24




























































BlackFigure 10. Ratio of Homicide Victimization Rates to Base Rate 





























































































































































Male SuspectsFigure A1. Arrests by Age Group as Percent of Total, 1999

















Under 18Figure A2. Arrests for Juveniles Under 18 as 
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